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The development of antimicrobial resistance
in many pathogenic microbes poses one of the
most serious problems in the control of infectious
diseases (1-3). Antimicrobial resistance results
from the ability of microbes to adapt to
anthropogenic pressures; therefore, it is not a
passing trend but likely a permanent feature in
the fight against infectious diseases (4). This
article highlights the legal issues involved in
addressing the problem of antimicrobial resis-
tance.
Law and Global Public Health
Globalization interferes with infectious
disease control at the national level (1,5-7). While
microbes move freely around the world,
unhindered by borders, human responses to
infectious diseases are conditioned by jurisdic-
tional boundaries. Therefore, public health
responses to infectious diseases must constantly
navigate the mazes created by international and
national law. Although national law now
dominates legal approaches to infectious dis-
eases, the global nature of the emerging
infectious disease problem points towards a
larger future role for international law.
Especially in federal systems, countries often
divide authority for public health among various
levels of government. In the United States, for
example, states have primary power for public
health because the Constitution did not grant the
federal government explicit public health powers
(8). While the federal government has authority
to act in the public health context (9), its statutes
and regulations derive from other federal powers.
Most U.S. public health law is at the state level.
The emerging infectious disease threat points to
a larger role not only for international but also for
federal law. Federal agencies create networks
that allow the state and national governments to
cooperate on issues such as antimicrobial
resistance, but public health law remains primarily
a state domain; therefore, state laws on public
health may need to be reevaluated in the context of
emerging infectious disease control (10).
Public Health Strategies to Address
Antimicrobial Resistance
The dominant public health strategy against
antimicrobial resistance contains improved
surveillance of resistant pathogens, as well as
rational use and increased research and
development of new antimicrobial drugs (1). These
elements fit within the larger strategy to address
emerging infectious diseases, which stresses
surveillance, applied research, prevention and
control, and infrastructure development (1).
Surveillance
Surveillance is critical to the control and
prevention of infectious diseases (1). Since no
national or global surveillance system exists for
monitoring antibiotic resistance, improved sur-
veillance is a top priority (11). Surveillance is also
useful in addressing the threat of biological
weapons and protecting the community from
highly contagious infectious diseases. Law is
critical to surveillance not only because reporting
information must be a legal duty, but also
because law is needed to deal with the tensions
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sometimes arising between individual privacy
rights and the community’s interest in being
protected from infectious diseases.
Reporting
International and domestic surveillance
systems are based on the legal duty to report
certain public health information. The Interna-
tional Health Regulations mandate, for example,
that member states of the World Health
Organization (WHO) report outbreaks of plague,
cholera, and yellow fever to WHO (12). Similarly,
state public health departments in the United
States legally mandate the reporting of cases of
certain diseases from health-care providers to
public health agencies (13).
Existing laws at the international and
national level require reporting of a limited
number of diseases, do not require systematic
reporting of antimicrobial resistance, and receive
inadequate compliance or noncompliance. WHO,
however, has proposed including surveillance of
antimicrobial resistance in the revisions of the
International Health Regulations (14-16) and
requiring drug resistance reporting.
In the United States, surveillance of
antimicrobial resistance has been described as
woeful (17). In 1992 less than $55,000 was spent
on antibiotic resistance surveillance for human
pathogens in the United States at the local, state,
and federal levels combined (11). While the need
for improved surveillance of antimicrobial resis-
tance is recognized (1), state reporting laws have
not changed much. For example, although the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists
recommended in 1995 that states make drug-
resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae reportable
(18), not all states have (D. Bell, pers. comm.).
Several factors explain the lag of state
responses to federal recommendations on
resistance surveillance. First, state laws on
infectious diseases often do not keep pace with
new scientific findings (10). In addition, many
states do not have within their legal systems the
flexibility needed to respond to new threats—as
was the case, for example, when the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists recom-
mended that Escherichia coli O157:H7 be made
reportable (13). Second, adding new surveillance
responsibilities is difficult because of inadequate
resources (13). These two factors indicate
inadequate emphasis on public health within
many state governments. The structure of public
health law in the United States can, therefore,
impede antimicrobial resistance strategies. As at
the international level, if reporting is not
required, surveillance for antimicrobial resis-
tance is compromised.
Changes in diagnostic testing in the United
States also raise public health and legal concerns
about surveillance. Privatization of laboratory
services by state legislatures may compromise
national surveillance of emerging infectious
diseases and investigation of outbreaks because
many surveillance systems rely on data from
state laboratories (13). In addition, because of
economic pressures, hospitals increasingly rely
on testing done in areas outside their
jurisdiction; therefore, accurate information on
infectious diseases in their areas may not be
available. Diagnostic testing done by private
laboratories may require closer federal regula-
tion to protect the quality of needed surveil-
lance data (D. Bell, pers. comm.).
Creation of a legal duty does not ensure the
success of a policy. WHO member states have
routinely ignored required outbreak reporting of
plague, cholera, and yellow fever (4,19,20).
Reporting of diseases within U.S. states is
sometimes poor, haphazard, and unhelpful (21).
Fulfillment of legal duties often hinges on
sufficient resources. In many developing coun-
tries public health systems may be inadequate
(22). Thus, financial and technical leadership is
needed from national governments towards local
authorities and from international organizations
towards developing countries. In addition to legal
requirements, national regulatory barriers may
also hinder global surveillance. Such surveillance
will require many countries to import and use
equipment, software, and reagents to detect and
report on antimicrobial resistance. Eliminating
barriers could improve prospects for global
surveillance. A precedent can be found in the
proposed Convention on the Provision of
Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Miti-
gation and Relief Operations, which obligates the
parties, where possible, to lower or remove
regulatory barriers for using telecommunication
resources during disasters (23).
Privacy Issues
Surveillance systems sometimes have to
balance the privacy of the patient with the need
for useful scientific and medical information and
the need of the community to be protected from171 Vol. 4, No. 2, April–June 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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the spread of infectious diseases (9). As the HIV/
AIDS epidemic has demonstrated, the privacy
issue is particularly acute in sexually transmit-
ted diseases. Because in some sexually transmit-
ted diseases, e.g., gonorrhea, the infectious
organisms are developing resistance to antibiot-
ics, the inherent privacy concerns are com-
pounded by surveillance-related privacy con-
cerns. Increased surveillance for antimicrobial
resistance may heighten privacy concerns with
respect to other diseases, such as multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis (MDRTB).
Different systems of law deal with privacy
concerns differently, which could create legal
problems for global surveillance of antimicrobial
resistance. The differences between U.S. and
European Union policies illustrate this difficulty.
In the United States, the privacy of health-
related information is of concern. Health
information gathered by public health agencies is
regulated largely by the Constitution and by
state statutes. While the Constitution “requires
reasonable levels of privacy and security when
the government collects personally identifiable
data through . . . disease reporting” (9), a recent
survey of U.S. state legislation on public health
information privacy concluded that many states’
safeguards of public health privacy are insuffi-
cient (24). Laws protecting private sector records
are even weaker (9). Some states regulate private
dissemination of health-related information
through physician-licensing systems, common-
law tort rules on invasion of privacy, or statutes
(25). Nevertheless, such legal regulations may
not adequately protect privacy, as health-related
information is increasingly manipulated elec-
tronically by health-care providers, health mainte-
nance organizations, and insurance companies (9).
Lack of laws adequately protecting the privacy of
health-care information has led to calls for federal
regulation (9,25,26), and some legislative proposals
have been introduced in Congress (27).
The European Union has a strict law
forbidding the processing of health information
data without the written permission of the patient
(28). This law places other strict conditions on the
use of health data directly affecting European
Union surveillance efforts. The contrast between
American and European legal protection for health-
related information may affect global surveillance
efforts because European law permits states to
withhold personal data from those who cannot
adequately  protect these data (26).
A particularly important development is the
growth of privately owned infectious disease
information. Private initiatives are building
global information-sharing networks on various
disease issues through the Internet and other
information technologies (4,29,30); private com-
panies are starting to monitor and test bacterial
resistance globally (31); and some for-profit
companies gather and sell epidemiologically
useful information. These private efforts raise
legal questions: privacy issues arise with the
dissemination of epidemiologic data by private
companies; this dissemination is treated differ-
ently in different countries; jurisdictional
problems arise regarding legal regulation of
information sharing in cyberspace (32) (the
quality of health information on the Internet, for
example, is being questioned [33-35]); and legal
(and ethical) concerns arise with the practice of
selling epidemiologic data, especially with data
gathering, and whether governments can compel
disclosure of privately gathered information in
the interest of public health.
Biological Weapons
While most of the pathogenic agents
considered to be the most likely candidates for
use as biological weapons do not exhibit
resistance (36), the potential use of resistant
pathogens as weapons is of concern because
resistance blunts one of the few lines of defense
against a biological weapons attack. For the U.S.
Department of Defense, antibiotic resistance is
one of the criteria for characterizing suspicious
outbreaks of infectious disease that might point
to a possible biological weapons event (37).
The main source of international law on
biological weapons, the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention, prohibits the development, produc-
tion, and stockpiling of biological and toxin
weapons (38). Negotiations are under way to
strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
through a protocol that both establishes
compliance procedures and commits states to
improving domestic and global surveillance of
infectious diseases (37). Calls for reform are also
being made in domestic legal systems (37). The
comprehensive statutory and regulatory system
in the United States that governs the acquisition,
use, and transfer of biological agents that pose a
threat to public health (39) might serve as a
model for legislation in other countries.172 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 4, No. 2, April–June 1998
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Personal Control Measures
The authority of public health officials to
detain or isolate persons infected with highly
contagious and resistant pathogens in order to
protect the community is another important legal
issue. MDRTB, for example, is a threat to public
health because it is highly infectious (10). To deal
with its TB epidemic, New York City has issued
dozens of orders to detain MDRTB patients for
isolation and compulsory treatment (40). Contro-
versy exists about the proper scope of detaining
patients for infectious disease control purposes
(13). While U.S. courts have upheld detaining
infected patients to protect public health (41),
governments today face heightened judicial
scrutiny of personal control measures in the
public health context (10,42). In one case in New
Jersey, the court held that public health
authorities, in applying a 1912 TB control
statute, had to comply with contemporary
notions of due process and the Americans with
Disabilities Act in order to detain and isolate a
patient with MDRTB (43). At a time when
antimicrobial resistance may have created a
greater need for personal control measures for
public health (e.g., with MDRTB), the status of
U.S. law on the scope and nature of the
government’s power to undertake such measures
seems unsettled (13). U.S. public health law may
need to be modified to allow public health officials
to control demonstrated threats of risk through
flexible policy options that minimize infringe-
ments on individual rights (10).
The proper scope of personal control
measures may appear pertinent only to industri-
alized countries, given that only those countries
can identify resistant pathogens and their human
hosts. In addition, the notion of personal control
measures against drug-resistant malaria pa-
tients in Africa seems far-fetched, given the scale
of the problem. Nevertheless, the importance of
international human rights law to effective
public health policies—as seen in the context of
HIV/AIDS (44)—demonstrates that complacency
towards individual rights in any public health
policy is dangerous legally and medically.
Rational Use of Antimicrobial Drugs
Antimicrobial drug misuse in both industrial-
ized and developing countries is a problem in
connection not only with human treatment, but
also with food production (11,45,46). More
rational use of antimicrobial drugs in every
country—for disease treatment and food produc-
tion—must be at the core of the response to
antimicrobial resistance.
Education has been suggested as the
primary tactic for improving antimicrobial
drug use (1,16). WHO has recommended “a code
of practice for prudent use of antimicrobials in
food animal production” (47).
However, the global scope of antimicrobial
resistance indicates that an integrated strategy
operating at both the national and international
legal levels is needed. Such an integrated
strategy faces political and legal challenges.
Building effective national legal regimes regard-
ing prudent antimicrobial use in many develop-
ing countries is unrealistic absent financial,
political, and legal support from the international
community (46). International legal harmoni-
zation of principles for prudent antimicrobial
drug use will have to include monitoring and
enforcement, as well as financial, technical, and
legal assistance by industrialized countries to
developing countries.
The international legal strategy needed will
be difficult to create. WHO’s limited powers to
adopt regulations (48) do not seem to extend to
creating regulations regarding the use of drugs.
WHO has not, for example, proposed revising the
International Health Regulations to rationalize
the use of antimicrobial drugs. WHO has authority
to adopt a convention on the use of antimicrobial
drugs (49), but it has not done so (4). As
illustrated by its proposal for a code of practice,
rather than regulations, for antimicrobial use in
food animal production, WHO historically has
preferred not to use international legal powers to
advance global health. Lessons from interna-
tional environmental efforts suggest that inter-
national law must play a major role in setting
international standards for implementation
domestically and creating the political, technical,
and financial conditions necessary to integrate
international and national law (19).
The misuse of antibiotics in food production
also raises concerns under international trade
law. If antimicrobial drugs routinely used by food
producers lose their effectiveness against ani-
mal-borne or plant-borne diseases, exports of
contaminated food may be restricted by countries
applying sanitary and phytosanitary measures
(SPS measures) under the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) and other international trade
agreements to keep such food out of their173 Vol. 4, No. 2, April–June 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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territories as threats to human, animal, or plant
health (50). In addition, exports might be
disrupted by countries applying SPS measures
under international trade agreements against
products suspected of containing harmful
residues of antimicrobial drugs. The Codex
Alimentarius Commission already sets stan-
dards for residues from veterinary drugs in food
through its Committee on Residues of Veterinary
Drugs in Foods, and WHO has recommended that
this Codex committee discuss antimicrobial
resistance (47). Codex standards have become
important in international trade law through the
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)
(50), which uses these standards as a basis for
international harmonization of SPS measures.
The importance of Codex food safety standards to
international trade law was seen in the Beef
Hormones Case, in which the WTO held that the
European Union violated the SPS Agreement for
not providing scientific justification for a beef
hormone regulation stricter than the relevant
Codex standards (51-53).
The inability of many governments to
regulate antimicrobial drug use and the
consequent misuse of these drugs raise the
possibility that countries might use trade
restrictions on food produced with improper use
of antimicrobial drugs. In this situation, the food
products might have residue levels below those
established as maximums by Codex, but the trade
restriction is intended to pressure the exporting
country to improve regulation of antimicrobial
drug use and the process by which the product is
made. In the context of environmental protection,
trade restrictions seeking to change a production
process in another country, rather than to protect
against health dangers from a particular product,
have been ruled incompatible with international
trade law (54-56). Although “relevant processes
and production methods” (SPS Agreement, art.
5.2) form part of a risk assessment under the SPS
Agreement, the risk must be a specific health risk
from the product (e.g., highly inconsistent
residue levels created by inadequate antimicro-
bial regulation) rather than fear of the health
consequences of antimicrobial misuse. To avoid
losing trade restrictions as part of a general
strategy to combat antimicrobial misuse, legiti-
mate trade restrictions against countries that
systematically neglect recognized principles and
practices for antimicrobial use might be
considered; such a move would elevate the status
of Codex’s Code of Practice for Control of the Use
of Veterinary Drugs and Guidelines for the
Establishment of a Regulatory Programme for
Control of Veterinary Drug Residues in Foods, as
the SPS Agreement has elevated the importance
of Codex’s Maximum Residue Levels for
Veterinary Drugs in Foods.
The International Conference on Harmoniza-
tion, a multilateral effort between the United
States, Japan, and the European Union to
harmonize pharmaceutical regulatory systems,
is another forum for discussing antimicrobial
drug resistance. If national regulatory systems
begin to grapple with the overuse of antimicrobial
drugs, the International Conference on Harmoni-
zation might provide a forum to discuss a
harmonized approach to more rational drug use
in the United States, Japan, and the European
Union. As structured, the Conference does not
include other countries where overuse of
antimicrobial drugs is a serious problem.
National laws for improving antimicrobial
drug use face difficulties in industrialized
countries; realistic national strategies confront
legal and political hurdles. In the United States,
state legislatures probably have the power to
regulate how physicians prescribe antimicrobial
drugs, but any attempt to legislate more rational
use of drugs might evoke negative reactions from
physicians and their medical associations, who
might oppose the government’s efforts to
interfere with their professional judgment (57). If
formal legislative regulation would not prove
feasible, an alternative would be self-regulation
by the medical and veterinary professions
through practice guidelines, for example (57). A
peer review process to monitor antimicrobial
drug use has also been recommended (1).
Managed care organizations may be included in
the effort to control misuse of antimicrobial
drugs, given their power and economic incentives
to curb such misuse by physicians.
Formal regulation of antimicrobial use may
be needed, which would involve monitoring and
enforcement. In the United States, Congress
could regulate use of antimicrobial drugs by
monitoring interstate commerce in these prod-
ucts. Congress probably does not have the
authority to regulate antimicrobial prescription
practices directly; such authority rests with the
states. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has authority to restrict the postapproval174 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 4, No. 2, April–June 1998
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marketing of new drugs designed for treating
serious or life-threatening illnesses and has
indicated that these regulations can be used
specifically in cases of new antimicrobial drugs
(17,58). Restricted distribution is, however, a
disincentive to the development of new drugs,
and the regulations do not address misuse of
existing products. Another regulatory strategy
available to the FDA for dealing with resistance
in existing products is to modify labeling
requirements; modifying labels is, however,
somewhat cumbersome (17). Effective regulatory
changes in the United States will be jeopardized
by the lack of similar changes in other countries.
Perhaps the most powerful U.S. federal
strategy would be to make implementation of
state policies to curb the misuse of antimicrobial
drugs mandatory before states receive federal
funds earmarked for public health. Although
states might argue that this would encroach on
their traditional public health rights and powers,
such a federal enactment would be constitutional.
In addition, using federal funds to improve
antimicrobial use policies nationwide fits with
the need for federal political leadership as well as
financial and technical assistance. State govern-
ments might, therefore, welcome federal money
conditioned on implementing policies the money
supports. Pharmaceutical companies, worried
about the federalization of policies affecting their
economic relationships with local and state
health-care providers, might oppose these
mandates. In addition, federal leadership in this
way would also run counter to trends in other
areas, such as welfare reform, which are moving
responsibilities from the federal to the state level.
In countries where governments subsidize
the purchase of antimicrobial drugs, legislative
or regulatory changes in these subsidies could
lead to a decline in the use of the drugs. When
Iceland ended government subsidies of antimicro-
bial drugs, their use in Iceland declined, while sales
kept increasing in other Nordic countries (59).
Although Iceland’s legislative change was made for
political, not medical reasons (59), it illustrates the
possible impact of legislative and regulatory
controls on the use of antimicrobial drugs.
Improving physicians’ awareness of antimicro-
bial resistance does not address, however, misuse of
these drugs by patients (60). MDRTB has developed
largely because of improper adherence by patients
to TB therapy (10); directly observed therapy was
initiated as a result. Because patient misuse of
antimicrobial drugs also contributes to the public
health crisis, proper completion of antimicrobial
therapy must also be addressed.
New Antimicrobial Drug Research and
Development (R&D)
As the antimicrobial arsenal shrinks, new
drug R&D becomes critical (1). Legislation at the
domestic level would ensure adequate funding for
public sector involvement. For diseases that pose
an especially large or complex problem (e.g.,
malaria), international law can play a role by
structuring international cooperation through
such institutions as WHO or the World Bank. The
recently proposed Multilateral Initiative on
Malaria, an international multiagency malaria
control program, involves, for example, plans to
coordinate R&D on antimalarial products
supported by WHO and the World Bank (61-63).
While public involvement and funds are
important, the real engine of pharmaceutical
development is the private sector. However,
pharmaceutical companies have only recently
brought new antimicrobial drugs forward for
regulatory approval. Critical disincentives con-
tinue to constrain private R&D investment in
new drugs: intellectual property protection,
regulatory approval procedures, and perceived
antitrust law limitations on collaborative R&D.
Intellectual Property Protection
Pharmaceutical companies fear that their
R&D efforts can be undermined by loss of
intellectual property rights. Lack of secure
patents deters pharmaceutical companies from
some R&D activities on new drugs. While the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights offers pharmaceuti-
cal companies better international legal rules on
patent protection (64), the loss of patented agents
remains a concern. Many WTO member states,
especially in developing countries, have to
upgrade their national laws to fulfill the
agreement obligations, a process that could take
years. International law on intellectual property
protection is, thus, a critical piece of the overall
strategy against antimicrobial resistance.
Other patent issues are relevant to the
problem of antimicrobial resistance. Pharmaceu-
tical companies that developed antibiotics years
ago but never commercially exploited them might
pursue more antimicrobial R&D if their earlier
antibiotics (now without patent protection) were175 Vol. 4, No. 2, April–June 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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given extra legal protection, either under patent
law or a legal regime like the Orphan Drug Act
(17). The efficacy of such legal strategies depends,
of course, on the number of promising antibiotics
potentially in the R&D pipeline.
Regulatory Approval Procedures
Another legal deterrent to antimicrobial
development is the varied, complex, and costly
regulatory approval procedures pharmaceutical
companies face in the United States and other
countries. Unilateral efforts are being made in the
United States and the European Union to
streamline drug approval regimes, and the
International Conference on Harmonization repre-
sents an international effort at harmonization.
Another approach involves creating “expe-
dited approval of new antimicrobials” (1). FDA,
which has already created accelerated approval
rules for drugs that treat serious or life-threatening
illnesses, has indicated that these rules could be
used to review new antibiotic treatments (17).
Antitrust Law Limitations on
Collaborative R&D
In some circumstances, collaborative R&D
efforts by a number of pharmaceutical companies
might be indicated. Pharmaceutical companies
have, however, noted the difficulties that
antitrust laws create for collaborative R&D
efforts. For example, in response to calls for
collaborative R&D on antimalarial drugs,
pharmaceutical companies are concerned about
sharing intellectual property and about laws
against cartels (65). Both U.S. antitrust law and
European Union competition law, however,
permit collaboration in certain areas (66,67). The
Inter-Company Collaboration for AIDS Drug
Development and the developing Multilateral
Initiative on Malaria set precedents and might be
replicated in the area of antimicrobial resistance.
Conclusion
Strategies to address antimicrobial resis-
tance as a public health and legal challenge must
consider three levels of interdependence: among
the antimicrobial drug surveillance, use, and
R&D components of the public health strategy;
among the levels of law—national and interna-
tional; and between the public health and legal
aspects of dealing with antimicrobial resistance.
Each element of the public health strategy
against antimicrobial resistance affects and
depends on the other elements. More rational use
of antimicrobial drugs and increased R&D
depend on accurate surveillance. Limitations on
the use of new drugs negatively affect the
incentives pharmaceutical companies have to
develop new drugs. Continued misuse of
antimicrobial drugs places more pressure on both
surveillance and new R&D. The effectiveness of
new drugs will have to be measured by accurate
surveillance and will continue to be undercut by
their misuse. The lack of new R&D will force
continued use of existing products, reducing their
effective life-span. Thus, any public health
strategy addressing antimicrobial resistance
must consider all three components.
Because antimicrobial resistance is a global
problem, national legal reforms taken in one or a
few countries would suffer if other countries did
not take similar actions. For example, since drug-
resistant pathogens travel easily in today’s
world, national legal reforms to rationalize
antimicrobial use in a few countries might be
subverted if such misuse is not curtailed in many
other countries. The creation of new interna-
tional legal duties would likewise be undermined
if such duties were not translated into national
law. Thus, any legal strategy against antimicro-
bial resistance must be pursued at both the
national and international levels.
Achieving the public health objectives of an
antimicrobial resistance strategy involves, at
each stage, legal considerations and often calls
for legal decisions. National and international
law are integral to the public health mission in
every country; the interdependence of public
health and law forms part of the large
multidisciplinary challenge created by the global
problem of emerging infectious diseases.
Confronting antimicrobial resistance requires
not only a scientific and public health strategy but
also a legal strategy. Including law in the
developing discourse will broaden and strengthen
the strategy for combating antimicrobial resistance.
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